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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

A decision recently handed down by Judge Anderson of the United States
circuit court of appeals is embodied in treasury decision No. 3368, published
in this month’s issue of The Journal of Accountancy. This decision
appertains to the subject of whether or not certain corporate bodies are
subject to the capital-stock tax under the revenue acts of 1916 and 1918.
The appealing taxpayers sought to be classed as “Massachusetts trusts” or
trusts, rather than associations. The court has written a comprehensive and
lucid definition of what must be present if a taxpayer is to be considered a
trust, and if this decision is read after a reading of solicitor’s memorandum
No. 1068, the court’s reasoning in the present cases becomes clear and his
conclusions logical. Solicitor’s memorandum No. 1068 reads as follows:

“Where beneficiaries holding certificates evidencing their interest under
a so-called ‘Massachusetts trust’ agreement annually elect persons delegated
to conduct the affairs of the trusts, thus retaining a voice in the business,
the trust is an association and is subject to normal tax upon its income
under the acts of 1913, 1916 and 1918; the excess profits tax under the
acts of 1917 and 1918; the capital stock tax under the acts of 1916 and
1918; and the certificates issued by the trust to the beneficiaries are sub
ject to the stamp tax under the acts of 1917 and 1918.
Where the trustees originally appointed were to hold office during the
entire period of the trust, the right of the shareholders being limited to
filling vacancies, the beneficiaries not retaining any substantial control over
the affairs of the trust, such a trust is not an association or taxable as
such under section 230 of the act of 1918, but under section 219 relating
to trusts. They are not subject to the excess profits tax nor the capital
stock tax, nor are the certificates issued by the trustees subject to stamp
tax.”
The court also has something to say with reference to non-par stock
which it would be well to add to one’s information upon that subject.
Another decision published this month deals with the subject of depletion
of oil and gas properties. This decision (No. 3386) amends the language
of article No. 170 of 1916 regulations No. 33. This is rather ancient, but
is published for the benefit of those who may still have controversies with
the government upon taxes under the revenue act of 1916.

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3368, July 12, 1922.)
Capital stock tax—Revenue acts of 1916 and 1918—Decision of court.
1. Tax Statutes—Rule of Construction.
While, in applying tax statutes, reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the taxpayer, revenue acts are not penal statutes; the govern
ment is not to be crippled by strained and unnatural construction of tax
statutes fairly plain.
2. Same.
When language used in an earlier statute has in application received
judicial construction, change in language in later analogous legislation
imports legislative purpose to attain a different result.
3. Associations—Taxability of Nonstatutory Associations—Construc
tion of Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1918.
The contrast between the language used in the act of August 5, 1909,
imposing a tax on every joint-stock company or association “organized
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under the laws of the United States,” etc., and in the revenue acts of
1916 and 1918, which imposed a capital stock tax upon associations “organ
ized in the United States,” shows that Congress intended to avoid the
effect of the holding in Elliott v. Freeman (220 U. S. 178), that the 1909
act did not cover certain Massachusetts trusts because limited to organi
zations deriving some power or benefit from statute. Therefore, nonstatutory associations are subject to the capital stock taxes imposed by
the revenue acts of 1916 and 1918.
4. Massachusetts Trusts—Taxability as “Associations”—Construc
tion of Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1918.
Section 407 of the revenue act of 1916 and section 1000 (a) of the
revenue act of 1918, imposing an excise tax measured by the value of
the capital stock of associations, include business organizations known
as Massachusetts trusts, where the shareholders or beneficiaries have
power to control the trustees.
5. Same—No Par Value of Stock, Effect of.
Whether the stock of a corporation, of an association, or of a joint-stock
company, has or has not par value is immaterial in determining liability for
the capital stock tax imposed by the revenue acts of 1916 and 1918, since
stockholders own beneficially the net value of the corporation’s assets,
whether a definite value is or is not attributed to their shares, severally or
in mass.
6. Same—General Purpose of Congress.
The manifest general purpose of Congress, in imposing a capital stock tax
by the revenue acts of 1916 and 1918, was to tax business deriving powers
and making profits from association, particularly business done by organi
zations getting all or a substantial part of their capital on transferable shares,
such as are commonly sold to the investing public.
7. Massachusetts Trusts—Effect of Enactment by Massachusetts
Legislature.
The Massachusetts Legislature, by acts passed prior to the passage of the
revenue acts of 1916 and 1918, expressly recognized Massachusetts trusts
as associations, not as trusts or partnerships; congress must be held to have
used the word “association” as the Massachusetts legislature had previously
defined and used it.
8. Same.
By act of 1916, chapter 184, the Massachusetts legislature made Massa
chusetts trusts liable to creditors in like manner as if corporations; by
analogy they have similar liability to the federal government for taxes.
9. Same—Prior Decisions.
Malley v. Bowditch (259 Fed. 809) followed and Crocker v. Malley (249
U. S. 223) distinguished.
The appended decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for
the first circuit, in the cases of Malley, former collector, v. Howard et al.,
trustees; Casey, acting collector, v. Howard et al., trustees; Malley, former
collector, v. Crocker et al., trustees; and Malley, former collector, v. Hecht
et al., trustees, is published for the information of internal revenue officers
and others concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Octo
ber Term, 1921.
No. 1551. John F. Malley, formerly collector of internal revenue, defendant,
plaintiff in error, V. Arthur L. Howard et al., trustees, plaintiffs, defend
ants in error. No. 1552. Andrew J. Casey, acting collector of internal
revenue defendant, plaintiff in error, v. Arthur L. Howard et al., trustees,
plaintiffs, defendants in error. No. 1553. John F. Malley, formerly col
lector of internal revenue, defendant, plaintiff in error v. Alvah Crocker
et al., trustees, plaintiffs, defendants in error. No. 1554. John F. Halley,
formerly collector of internal revenue, defendant, plaintiff in error, v.
Louis Hecht jr., et al., trustees, plaintiffs, defendants in error.
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Error to the District Court of the United States for the district of
Before Bingham, Johnson, and Anderson, Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

[June 6, 1922.]
Anderson, judge: These cases involve the validity of taxes imposed upon
business organizations, commonly known as Massachusetts trusts, under the
revenue acts of 1916 (39 Stat. 789) and 1918 (40 Stat. 1057). Nos. 1551
and 1552 involve the Haymarket Trust and we treat them as one case. The
cases were argued as a group and may be conveniently dealt with in one
opinion.
The chief business of the Haymarket and Hecht trusts is that of owning,
managing, and leasing real estate, and distributing the net income to its
shareholders. These concerns deny that they are associations within the
meaning of the statutes.
The Crocker trust is a large manufacturing concern. It admits that it is
an association within the meaning of the statutes, but it claims immunity
from the tax on the ground that it has no capital stock within their meaning.
The court below sustained the plaintiff’s contentions in each case, and the
government brought the cases here on writs of error.
The fundamental question is whether the plaintiffs are associations having
a capital stock represented by shares, within the meaning of these provisions.
So far as the issues in these cases are concerned, the provisions of the two
statutes seem to us to be equivalent, for there is now presented no contro
verted question as to the amount of any tax; we therefore need not consider
the different amounts exempt under the two statutes or the retroactive and
substitutional effect of the 1918 statute.
The act of 1916 levies a tax on associations “now or hereafter organized in
the United States for profit and having a capital stock represented by shares
* * * with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such * * *
association * * * equivalent to 50 cents for each $1,000 of the fair value
of its capital stock, and in estimating the value of capital stock the surplus
and undivided profits shall be included. * * * The amount of such annual
tax shall in all cases be computed on the basis of the fair average value of
the capital stock for the preceding year”—with an exemption not now
material.
The act of 1918, section 1, includes associations under the term “corpora
tion;” and in section 1000 (a) provides for an annual "special excise tax
with respect to carrying on or doing business equivalent to $1 for each
$1,000 of so much of the fair average value of its capital stock for the pre
ceding year,” etc. "In estimating the value of capital stock the surplus and
undivided profits shall be included."
Both acts are conceded to levy an excise tax with respect to doing business,
the amount of the tax being measured by the average value of the capital
stock, including any surplus and undivided profits as a part thereof. All
the plaintiffs agree that they are doing business within the meaning of
these acts.
While we recognize that in applying this and every other tax statute rea
sonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer (Gould v. Gould,
245 U. S. 151) yet revenue acts are not penal statutes; the government is
not to be crippled by strained and unnatural construction of tax statutes
fairly plain—Cliquot’s Champagne (3 Wall. 114, 115) ; United States v.
Hodson (10 Wall. 395) ; Worth Bros. v. Lederer (251 U. S. 507).
Taxation of this general kind began with the passage of the act of August
5, 1909 (36 Stat. 11, 112), which imposed a tax “on every corporation, jointstock company, or association organized for profit and having a capital stock
represented by shares * * * now or hereafter organized under the laws
of the United States or of any State or Territory * * * with respect
to the carrying on or doing business by * * * such corporation, jointstock company, or association * * * equivalent to 1 per cent upon the
entire net income over and above $5,000,” etc.
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This statute, passed before we had the sixteenth amendment, was attacked
as an income tax and therefore unconstitutional. But the supreme court held
that it was not an income tax, and sustained it as an excise tax—Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co. (1911), (220 U. S. 107). It was measured by the income,
not as under the present law, on the capital used.
In Eliot v. Freeman (220 U. S. 178), the court at the same time held the
act of 1909 not to cover two typical Massachusetts real estate trusts, on the
ground that “the language of the act, ‘now or hereafter organized under the
laws of the United States,’ etc., imports an organization deriving power
from statutory enactment.” Organized as purely nonstatutory, they were
exempt.
The gist of the present case is whether the statutes of 1916 and 1918 are,
as the plaintiffs contend, to be given the same interpretation in favor of
exempting such organizations as was given by the supreme court to the
act of 1909.
The government, on the other hand, contends that the language of the
acts is plainly applicable to such organizations; that the history of the legis
lation shows that congress intended to avoid the result reached in Eliot v.
Freeman, supra, and that there are no applicable decisions of the courts sup
porting the plaintiffs’ position. We think the government is right, and that
the court below erred in holding that such organizations are not associations
within the meaning of these revenue acts.
The language of the statutes, supra, seems so plain that repetition and par
aphrasing would add nothing.
The history of the legislation lends emphasis to the initial impression of
its import. For it is elementary that when language used in an earlier statute
has in application received judicial construction change in language in later
analogous legislation imports legislative purpose to attain a different result.
If congress had intended the acts in question to have the restricted applica
tion given by the supreme court to the act of 1909, there was no conceivable
reason for changing the words “organized under the laws of the United
States or of any State,” etc., etc., to “organized in the United States.”
We think it plain that by this change congress intended in the later acts
to include nonstatutory organizations and to avoid the restriction found by
the supreme court in the words of the 1909 act. We can not accord with
the learned district judge in his view that “it is hard to discover any sub
stantial distinction between the scope of” the act of 1909 and the acts of 1916
and 1918 “as far as ‘associations’ are concerned.” We think there is a vital
and controlling distinction.
Eliot v. Freeman was decided in 1911. In 1913 an income tax act was
passed (38 Stat. 114, 166), imposing such tax “on every corporation, jointstock company, or association, and every insurance company organized in
the United States, no matter how created or organized, not including part
nerships.” The original case of Crocker v. Malley (249 U. S. 233), the
plaintiffs’ chief reliance, arose under this statute. Sitting as district court,
Judge Bingham, in July, 1917, held the Wachusett Realty Co., the prede
cessor of the present Crocker Association, a trust, according in that regard
with Judge Hale in a decision made on May 23, 1914, in the case of Crocker
v. Crocker.
But in this court (250 Fed. 817) the organization was held an association
within the meaning of the statute. The supreme court reversed this court,
adopting the view of the district court. The decisions, both in the supreme
and district courts, against the government, turned upon the fact that the
shareholders had no real control over the trust estate; so that it therefore
fell within the doctrine of Williams v. Milton (215 Mass. 1), from the
opinion in which Mr. Justice Holmes quoted (249 U. S. 223, 232) as follows:
There can be little doubt that in Massachusetts this arrangement would
be held to create a trust and nothing more. “The certificate holders * * *
are in no way associated together, nor is there any provision in the [instru
ment] for any meeting to be held by them. The only act which (under the
[declaration of] trust) they can do is to consent to an alteration * * *
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of the trust” and to the other matters that we have mentioned. They are
confined to giving or withholding assent, and the giving or withholding it
“is not to be had in a meeting, but is to be given them individually.” “The
sole right of the cestius que trust is to have the property administered in
their interest by the trustees, who are the masters, to receive income while
the trust lasts, and their share of the corpus when the trust comes to an end.”
The trustees of the Wachusett concern held title, subject to a long lease,
to eight mills and to the stock of the corporation operating these mills, and
distributed the net income to the eight beneficiaries of the trust. The
trustees were not managing the mills; the organization was not a business
enterprise within the normal use of that term. The beneficiaries were
“admitted not to be partners in any sense * * * have no joint action or
interest and no control over the fund.” (249 U. S. 234.)
The court, in referring to the phrase in the statute “no matter how created
or organized,” says:
The trust that has been described would not fall under any familiar con
ception of a joint-stock association, whether formed under a statute or not.
Citing Smith v. Anderson (15 Ch. Div. 247, 273, 274, 277, 282).
Moreover, the tax then sought to be sustained was levied, at least in sub
stantial part, in respect of dividends received from a corporation that itself
was taxable upon its net income. The court therefore held that “as the
plaintiffs undeniably are trustees, if they are subjected to a double liability,
the language of the statute must make the intention clear.”—Gould v. Gould
(245 U. S. 151, 153).
It is thus apparent that the Wachusett Realty Co. was in organization and
purpose but an ordinary inter vivos trust for eight beneficiaries; also that
the tax sought to be imposed would have resulted in double taxation, never
easily inferred. It was in nature, and in relations to its shareholders and to
society at large, radically different from the plaintiffs’ organizations described
below. That decision lends no support to the plaintiffs’ contention.
Next in chronological order was the stamp tax provision of the act of
October 22, 1914 (38 Stat. 745, 775). This act imposed a stamp tax on
“each original issue * * * of certificates of stock by any association,
company, or corporation.” This court in Malley v. Bowditch (259 Fed. 809)
held such tax applicable on the original issue of certificates or shares of the
Pepperell Manufacturing Co., “a manufacturing company organized in the
form of a trust under the common law and deriving none of its rights, qual
ities, or benefits from any statute.” The crucial question in that case, as in
the case at bar, was whether the organization was an association within the
meaning of the Federal tax act. The case is, in essentials, difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish from the cases at bar. The cogent opinion of Judge
Brown is applicable to most aspects of the present problem. It might well
be quoted from at length.
The revenue acts of 1916 and 1918, supra, both in their income and excise
tax provisions, adopt the same broad phrasing as to joint stock companies
or associations “organized in the United States,” thus showing a continuing
legislative purpose to avoid the limitation found by the supreme court in
Eliot v. Freeman, supra, arising out of the language “organized under the
laws of the United States or of any State,” etc.
Plainly, there is nothing in this history of legislative and judicial dealing
with the matter lending support to plaintiffs’ contention that congress intended
to exempt such business organizations as the plaintiffs. Rather does the
history support the natural construction of the acts in question.
We find nothing else in the history of the legislation concerning this and
analogous forms of taxes, nor in other cases cited, tending to uphold the
plaintiffs’ contentions or otherwise calling for analysis and discussion.
A brief description of the three plaintiffs’ organizations will conveniently
precede our final considerations. We take first the Hecht case, agreeing
with learned counsel that it is the strongest case for the plaintiff.
On superficial examination, this organization looks somewhat like a family
affair, making provision for members of the Hecht family, immature or
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otherwise unfitted for business responsibilities. But on analysis fe find the
organization is a very genuine business concern.
In 1899, members of the Hecht family holding as tenants in common real
estate on Federal Street and Atlantic Avenue, Boston, conveyed it to Jacob
Hecht, who declared a trust for 12 beneficiaries all named Hecht, who
received certificates transferable like ordinary corporation shares, but with
a restriction in favor of lineal descendants of Elias Hecht, and, on certain
contingencies not now important, to be offered to the trustee before sold to
an outsider. The restriction is analogous to the close corporation provisiondealt with in New England Trust Co. v. Abbott (162 Mass. 148). It is in no
way peculiar to a trust as distinguished from a corporation. While the
Hecht trustee has broad general powers of management, including power to
buy and sell, the seat of real power is with the shareholders and not with
the trustee; for three-fourths of the shareholders may remove the trustee,
three-fifths may terminate the trust or give him binding instructions, and
also—what is of vital importance—modify the instrument in any particular.
This power to modify covers, potentially, the right to extend or change the
business so as to make it as large and as corporate in form and function as
the Crocker concern, which admits that it has evolved into an association.
The Hecht organization is not a trust within the doctrine of the Massachu
setts decisions.—Williams v. Milton (215 Mass. 1). Compare Crocker v.
Malley (249 U. S. 223) ; in re Associated Trust, (222 Fed. 1012). The
Hecht trustee has made annual statements showing the assets, liabilities and
net income, and kept books, containing a capital account and surplus account.
Its stockholders have, sensibly and we think legally, treated their dividends
like corporation dividends in their income tax returns. They have thus by
conduct, presumably under the advice of counsel, denied that they are part
ners taxable under the act of 1918 (sec. 218 (a)).
Parenthetically, we note that counsel do not contend that the shareholders
of any of these plaintiff associations are partners. There is no suggestion
that any of the shareholders in any of the plaintiff organizations have made,
propose to make, or could make, tax returns as partners in these business
concerns. Manifestly, counsel would deprecate such result as imposing bur
dens probably much heavier—certainly difficult if not impossible of ascer
tainment—upon the shareholders in such organizations. Their quest is tax
exemption, not tax substitution. Compare Dana v. Treasurer (227 Mass.
562, 565) ; Frost v. Thompson (219 Mass. 360).
Plainly, the Hecht Trust is quasi-corporate in form and power. It is an
association within the meaning of the revenue acts.
The Haymarket Trust, both in genesis and organization, is even more
like a corporation. It has none of the aspects of a family affair. It started
by securing from the investing public $250,000 on solicited subscriptions, the
trustee paying a commission of $2,500 to the promoter for thus raising the
capital for doing business. The declaration of trust provides for nearly all
the machinery and proceedings of an ordinary corporation. We hold it also
to be quasi-corporate and an association within the meaning of the reve
nue acts.
Learned counsel in the Crocker case admit that it is an association but
claim exemption on the ground that the concern has no capital stock. This
association was evolved from the Wachusett Realty Trust, above referred
to. As there pointed out, the shareholders had under the Wachusett declara
tion no power to amend without the assent of the trustees. But in June,
1917, shareholders and trustees both agreeing, the organization was rad
ically altered. Its name was changed and in express terms it agreed that
its form should thereafter be “changed to that of an association,” with
power to take over and carry on the extensive manufacturing business pre
viously carried on by the corporation whose stock it had held, or any sub
stantially similar business.
The new organization conforms closely to the corporation model—in pow
ers, in official personnel, and in methods of doing business. It has issued
96,000 shares of no par value, transferable like corporation stock, but with
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a restriction somewhat like that in the case of New England Trust Co. v.
Abbott, supra.
Conceding that it is an association with transferable shares, this plaintiff
yet seeks exemption on the ground that it has attached no par value to its
96,000 shares. It admits that if it had attached a par value of, say, $100 to
each of these shares, making a capital account of $9,600,000, a little less than
is shown on its balance sheet of July 1, 1917, where the interest of the share
holders is put down as $9,877,105.16—the concern would have had a capital
stock represented by shares, and thus be an association within the meaning
of the revenue acts, supra.
We can not adopt this scholastic and artificial distinction. Cf. Worth Bros.
v. Lederer (251 U. S. 507, 510). It is for present purposes immaterial
whether the stock of a corporation, of an association, or a joint-stock com
pany has or has not par value. Compare General Laws of Massachusetts
(ch. 156, secs. 14, 15, 47). Stockholders, whether a definite value is or is
not attributed to their shares, severally or in mass, own beneficially the net
value of the corporation’s assets—that is, whatever may remain after dis
charging debts.
See Hood Rubber Co. v. Commonwealth (238 Mass. 369, 371). Cook—
“Stock Without Par Value,” American Bar Association Journal, October,
1921; Hollen and Tuthill, “Stock Having No Par Value,” American Bar
Association Journal, November, 1921, page 578; Colton, “Par Value v.
No Par Value Stock,” American Bar Association Journal, December, 1921,
page 671.
Compare also Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S. 189, 209 et seq.).
Congress intended that this tax should be measured by the average amount
of capital used during the tax year in doing the business. The phrase in
the statutes as to “including surplus and undivided profits” puts beyond doubt
the question of the congressional intent to measure this tax by business and
financial realities, not by bookkeeping forms or mere names. “Fair value”
and “fair average value” carry the same notion. Cf. Wright v. Georgia
R. R. et al. (216 U. S. 420, 424, 425).
The Crocker Association can not escape taxation, falling on its compet
itors, by adopting the modern theory of no par value for its stock. The
presumption is against such immunity; it savors of special privilege. Com
pare United States v. Dickson (15 Pet. 141, 165).
It is a matter of common knowledge that, for most business and financial
purposes, all the larger organizations of this sort have for years been indis
tinguishable from corporations. One might almost say that they are a device
under which parties make their own corporation code. Business concerns
so organized have come to occupy a large field in industry and in finance.
At least two substantial textbooks have been written on the law concerning
such organizations and dealing with their advantages for general business
purposes. See Sears, Trust Estates as Business Companies (1st ed. 1912,
2d ed. 1921). Note the long list of industries so organized referred to on
pages VI and VII of the preface of the 1921 edition. See Wrightington on
Unincorporated Associations, 1916. In Dana v. Treasurer (227 Mass. 562,
565) it appears that the Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., commonly known
to be one of the largest enterprises in New England, is so organized. The
Pepperell Manufacturing Co., before this court in Malley v. Bowditch, supra,
had a capitalization of over $7,500,000; the Crocker Trust operates large
paper-manufacturing mills, employing about 1,000 men, with gross assets
of over $10,000,000.
Such concerns have long been recognized as quasi corporate in form.
In 1904 Chief Justice Knowlton in the Massachusetts supreme court said
of a typical one of them, in Hussey v. Arnold (185 Mass. 202) :
The agreement creating the trust has peculiar provisions. The object of
it apparently was to obtain for the associates most of the advantages belong
ing to corporations, without the authority of any legislative act, and with
freedom from the restrictions and regulations imposed by law upon cor
porations.
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No amplification of words could more accurately and adequately charac
terize this sort of business organization. Other cases in the Massachusetts
reports concerning them abound in similar observations as to their resem
blance to corporations—Williams v. Milton (215 Mass. 1) and cases cited.
See Williams v. Boston (208 Mass. 497) ; Phillips v. Blatchford (137 Mass.
510, 515) ; Tyrrell v. Washburn (6 Allen, 466, 474).
But the proposition that they are quasi corporate in form need not rest
merely on our own analysis or on observations found in the decisions of theMassachusetts courts. It has now been distinctly recognized by the Massa
chusetts legislature; they have a statutory status as associations, not as
trusts or as partnerships.
In the decision below these organizations have been treated as having no
status not arising out of the common law; so also in the briefs of the gov
ernment and of counsel for the defendant. It seems to have been over
looked that they have acquired in Massachusetts a distinct statutory basis.
This, if the question before us were otherwise doubtful, would seem to us
of much significance. See General Laws of Massachusetts, 1921 (ch. 182),
codifying earlier legislation of 1909, 1913, 1914, 1915, and 1916. Compare
also acts of 1921 (ch. 368). The title of this chapter is “Voluntary Asso
ciations.”
In section 1 of this act, dealing with definitions, it is provided:
“Association,” a voluntary association under a written instrument or dec
laration of trust, the beneficial interest under which is divided into transfer
able certificates of participation or shares.
This definition exactly fits the plaintiffs at bar.
In section 2 it is provided that the written instrument or declaration creat
ing the association shall be filed with the commissioner of corporations, and
with the clerk of every town where such association has a usual place of
business. Section 5 requires the commissioner to transmit to the secretary
of state copies of such instruments or of any amendments filed during the
previous year, to be printed as a public document. The instruments creating
such associations are thus made even more generally accessible than are
ordinary corporation charters.
Sections 3 and 4 and 7 to 11 deal specially with associations owning stock
of public utility companies; they need no present comment.
Section 6—a reenactment of the act of 1916, chapter 184, passed subse
quent to all the Massachusetts decisions cited and relied upon by the plain
tiffs—has probably the most direct bearing on our present problem. It is
as follows:
An association may be sued in an action at law for debts and other obli
gations or liabilities contracted or incurred by the trustees, or by the duly
authorized agents of such trustees, or by any duly authorized officer of the
association, in performance of their respective duties under such written
instruments or declarations of trust, and for any damages to persons or
property resulting from the negligence of such trustees, agents or officers
acting in the performance of their respective duties, and its property shall
be subject to attachment and execution in like manner as if it were a cor
poration, and service of process upon one of the trustees shall be sufficient.
Here is a distinct enactment that such associations shall be suable in like
manner as if corporations. An organization described as an association and
made generally liable “to attachment and execution in like manner as if it
were a corporation” can not easily be held a partnership or a trust.
We are not called upon to deal with the confusing and perhaps irrecon
cilable decisions of the Massachusetts courts concerning the nature and legal
incidents of these associations, most of which were made before the passage
of this act of 1916, or with the effect of this legislation upon their powers
and liabilities—except so far as pertains to our single problem of determining
whether these associations are liable to Federal taxation under the revenue
acts, supra. We intimate no opinion on any other question. But when a
Massachusetts statute has described such organizations as associations, and
have put their liability to ordinary creditors apparently on the same basis as
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that of corporations, we have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that
they have now been given a statutory basis as quasi-corporate, and that they
are associations within the meaning of the federal statutes, as well as under
the Massachusetts statutes. We can not hold Massachusetts associations,
liable under Massachusetts statutes to ordinary creditors as though corpo
rations, not liable under federal statutes to taxation imposed generally on
corporations, joint-stock companies, and associations.
It may be argued that these statutes are distinguished from corporation
acts in that their chief functions are to regulate or restrict, whereas cor
poration acts also empower. Technically, that may be so. But the powers
of these voluntary associations are in many respects greater, and the regu
lations and restrictions less, than in the case of corporations. Broadly
speaking, their promoters select and define such powers and provide such
limitations of liability as they desire. Cf. Hussey v. Arnold, supra. If
and in so far, therefore, as the tax in question is directed at “the privilege”
or power of doing business through large organizations—and particularly at
the power to obtain money from the outside public on transferable shares
—voluntary association offers at least as much “privilege” as does any cor
poration form of organization. Associations are resorted to, not because
thought weaker, but because thought stronger than corporations.
If, in constructing the statutes, we may look at the policy congress prob
ably desired o adopt, it could not be overlooked that the plaintiff conten
tion, if sustained, would amount to a discriminatory immunity in favor of
a kind of business organization, the nature and activities of which have
hitherto been the subject of much question and investigation. See the
Report of the Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts on Voluntary Associa
tions, under resolves of 1911, chapter 55—a very interesting document—in
which Commissioner Trefry ably reviewed their origin, history, and legal
incidents, both in England and in this country; referring, passim, and par
ticularly on page 13, to many other documents and legislative reports con
cerning them. See also a report of the special commissions to investigate
voluntary associations, January, 1914, made under Massachusetts Resolves
of 1912, chapter 113. In the resolve of 1911, chapter 55, the commissioner
was required to make an investigation, “with a view to determine” inter
alia, “whether * ♦ * their prohibition * * * is advisable in the
public interest."
There is, we think, no conceivable reason why congress should have desired
to favor organizations of this questioned sort by exempting them from tax
ation to which their competitors in corporate form are subjected. The pre
sumption is plainly the other way. Modern corporation laws furnish adequate
machinery for carrying on every legitimate form of business, including now
that of dealing in real estate. See General Laws of Massachusetts (ch.
156, passim, sec. 7), authorizing real estate corporations. There is no
present reason for resorting to this form of organization, except on the
theory that more “privileges of doing business” may be thus acquired than
by conforming to our broad and elastic corporation laws. To hold that
congress intended to discriminate in their favor would be to disregard the
letter, the spirit, and the reason of the acts.
Our views accord with those expressed by Judge Page in Chicago Title
and Trust Co. v. Smietanka (275 Fed. 60). The reasoning of Judge Morton
in the Associated Trust case) 222 Fed. 1012), where he reached the conclu
sion that such an association was an “unincorporated company” within the
meaning of the bankruptcy act, seems to us to sustain our conclusions rather
than those reached by the learned judge in the instant cases.
We may summarize our conclusions as follows:
(1) The natural interpretation of the language used in the acts of 1916
and 1918 would include plaintiffs’ organizations as associations.
(2) The contrast between the language used in the act of 1909 “organized
under the laws of the United States or any state,” etc., and in the acts of
1916 and 1918 “organized in the United States,” shows that congress intended
to avoid the result reached in 1911 by the supreme court in Eliot v. Freeman.
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(3) The manifest general purpose of congress was to tax business de
riving powers and making profits from association, particularly business
done by organizations getting all or a substantial part of their capital on
transferable shares, such as are commonly sold to the investing public.
(4) Prior to the passage of either the revenue act of 1916 or 1918, the
Massachusetts legislature had by the acts of 1909 and 1914 expressly rec
ognized such organizations as associations. Congress used the word “asso
ciation” as the Masachusetts legislature had previously defined and used it.
(5) By the act of 1916, the Massachusetts legislature made such associa
tions liable to creditors in like manner as if corporations; by analogy they
have similar liability to the federal government for taxes.
(6) The case of Malley v. Crocker (249 U. S. 223) makes, on analysis
of the Wachusett Trust and the reasoning of the court, not for the plaintiffs
but for the government. One ground of that decision was to avoid unjust,
discriminatory double taxation; whereas, to sustain the plaintiffs’ contention
would create discriminatory immunity for a large class of business organi
zations, thus giving them an unfair advantage over their incorporated
competitors.
(7) The conclusion now reached accords with the reasoning and decision
of this court in Malley v. Bowditch (259 Fed. 809).
In each case the judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion; the plaintiff in error recovers costs in this court.

(T. D. 3383, August 9, 1922.)
Estate or inheritance taxes.
Receipt of Liberty bonds, Victory notes, and Treasury notes in payment
thereof.
The appended department circular, issued under date of June 30, 1922,
with reference to receipt of Treasury notes of the United States in payment
of Federal estate and inheritance taxes, is published for the information of
internal-revenue officers and others concerned. This circular supplements
Department Circular No. 225, dated January 31, 1921 (T. D. 3144).
treasury department, June 30, 1922.
1. The provisions of department circular No. 225, dated January 31, 1921,
prescribing regulations governing the receipt of Liberty bonds and Victory
notes for federal estate or inheritance taxes, are hereby extended and made
applicable to treasury notes of the United States now or hereafter issued
under authority of section 18 of the second Liberty bond act, as amended
and supplemented, bearing interest at a higher rate than 4 per cent per
annum, and any such Treasury notes shall accordingly be receivable by the
United States at par and accrued interest in payment of any estate or inher
itance taxes imposed by the United States, under or by virtue of any present
or future law, upon the same terms and conditions as provided in said
department circular No. 225, dated January 31, 1921, with respect to the
acceptance of Liberty bonds and Victory notes bearing interest at a higher
rate than 4 per cent per annum.
2. The issues of treasury notes at this date outstanding, bearing interest
at a higher rate than 4 per cent per annum, are:
Description.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

5¾
5½
4¾
4¾
4⅜

per cent
per cent
per cent
per cent
per cent

notes,
notes,
notes,
notes,
notes,

payable June
payable Sept.
payable Mar.
payable Mar.
payable Dec.

Date of Issue.

15,
15,
15,
15,
15,

1924.......
1924.......
1925.......
1926.......
1925.......

June
Sept.
Feb.
Mar.
June

15,
15,
1,
15,
15,

1921
1921
1922
1922
1922

Short title.

Series
Series
Series
Series
Series

A-1924.
B-1924.
A-1925.
A-1926.
B-1925.

3. For the calculation of accrued interest on the current coupons of
Treasury notes tendered in payment of estate or inheritance taxes under
this circular, the method outlined in exhibit B to department circular No.
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225, dated January 31, 1921, should be followed. Interest tables at the
various rates borne by treasury notes may be obtained from the treasury
department, division of loans and currency, Washington. The interest
tables appropriate for use in connection with the issues of treasury notes at
present outstanding are as follows:
Form general 1017, for series A-1924 (interest dates June 15 and Decem
ber 15).
Form general 1016, for series B-1924 (interest dates March 15 and Sep
tember 15).
Form L. & C. 369, for series A-1925 prior to September 15, 1922 (interest
during this period is on annual 365-day basis).
Form L. & C. 435, for series A-1925 subsequent to September 15, 1922
(interest dates March 15 and September 15).
Form L. & C. 435, for series A-1926 (interest dates March 15 and Sep
tember 15).
Interest tables or decimals for computing interest as may be required for
other or future issues may be obtained from the treasury department, division
of loans and currency, Washington, upon request.
(T. D. 3386, Aug. 22, 1922.)
Income tax—Depletion—Oil and gas properties.
Sections 5 and 12 of revenue act of 1916, article 170, Regulations No. 33
(revised), amended.
DEPLETION—OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES.

Art. 170. Sections 5 and 12 of the act of September 8, 1916, as
497 amended by the act of October 3, 1917, authorize:
A reasonable allowance * * * for actual reduction in flow and
498 production * * * provided that when the allowance authorized
* * * shall equal the capital originally invested, or in case of pur
chase made prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market value as of that date,
no further allowance shall be made.
The essence of this provision of law is that the owner or operator
499 of this character of properties shall secure through an aggregate
of annual depletion deductions the return of the amount of capital
actually invested, or an amount not in excess of the fair market value as of
March 1, 1913, of the properties owned prior to that date.
For the purpose of determining the amount of capital to be re500 turned through annual deductions, operators may be divided into two
classes, (a) operators who own the fee, and (b) operators who own
a lease or leases.
In the case of the operating fee owner, the amount returnable
501 through depletion deductions is the fair market value of the prop
erty (exclusive of the cost of physical property) as of March 1,
1913, if acquired prior to that date, or the actual cost of the property if
acquired on or after that date, plus, in either case, the cost of development
(other than the cost of physical property incident to such development) up
to the point at which the income from the developed territory equals or
exceeds the deductible expenses.
In the case of a lessee, the capital thus to be returned is the fair
502 market value of the lessee’s interest as of March 1, 1913, if acquired
prior to that date, or the amount paid in cash or its equivalent as a
bonus or otherwise by the lessee for the lease if acquired on or after that
date, plus, in either case, all expenses incurred in developing the property
(exclusive of physical property) prior to the receipt of income therefrom
sufficient to meet all deductible expenses, after which time as to both owner
and lessee, such incidental expenses as are paid for wages, fuel, repairs,
hauling, etc., in connection with the drilling of wells and further develop
ment of the property, may, at the option of the operator, be deducted as an
operating expense or charged to capital account. The value of the equities
of lessor and lessee shall be computed separately, but when determined as
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of the same basic date, shall together never exceed the value at that date
of the property in fee simple. By “basic date” is meant March 1, 1913, in
case of acquisition prior to that date, or the date of acquisition where it
occurred on or after that date.
If, in exercising the option mentioned in the preceding paragraph
the individual or corporation charges the expense of drilling wells or 503
further development to capital account, the same, in so far as such
expense is represented by physical property, may be taken into account in
determining a reasonable allowance for depreciation during each year until
the property account thus augmented has been extinguished through annual
depreciation deductions, after which no further deduction on this account
will be allowed. In the case of a going or producing business, the cost of
drilling non-productive wells may be deducted from gross income as an
operating expense.
ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE RESOURCES.

In the case of either an owner or lessee it will be required that an
estimate, subject to the approval of the commissioner of internal 504
revenue, shall be made of the probable quantity of oil or gas con
tained in or to be recovered from the territory with respect to which the
investment is made. The invested capital (value as of March 1, 1913, or
cost, if acquired on or after that date, plus the cost of development, other
than cost of physical property, up to the point of expense-paying produc
tion), will be divided by the number of units of oil or gas so estimated to
be contained in or to be recovered from the territory, and the quotient
will be the per unit cost or amount of capital invested in each unit recover
able. This quotient, or per unit cost, when multiplied by the number of
units removed from the territory during any one year, will determine the
amount which may be allowably deducted from the gross income of that
year on account of depletion of assets or as a return of invested capital
until the total of such deductions shall equal the capital invested.
Every individual or corporation entitled to a deduction on account
of the depletion of the property under operation or for a return of the 505
capital invested with respect to the same shall keep an accurate ledger
account, in which, in the case of fee owner, shall be charged the fair market
value as of March 1, 1913, or the cost, if acquired on or after that date,
of the oil or gas property, plus cost of development as hereinbefore de
fined, or, in the case of a lessee, the fair market value as of March 1, 1913,
or the cost, if acquired on or after that date, of the lessee’s interest, plus
cost of development. This account shall be credited with the amount
claimed and allowed each year as a deduction on account of depletion or
as a return of capital, to the end that when the credits to the account equal
the debits no further deduction on either account, with respect to this
property and the capital invested therein, will be allowed. Or, in lieu of a
direct credit to property account, the amount so claimed and allowed as a
deduction may be credited to a depletion reserve account.
WHERE RESOURCES ARE UNCERTAIN

If for any reason the quantity of oil or gas in the property can not
be determined with any degree of certainty, the depletion deduction 506
will be computed in accordance with the rule set out in T. D. 2447,
except that lessees may compute their deduction for return of capital in
the same manner as owners in fee; that is, they may extinguish their
capital on the basis of the reduction in flow and production as compared
with the preceding year, or, in the case of leasehold properties brought in
or developed during the year, the depletion deduction may be computed
on the basis of the decline in settled flow and production, as evidenced by
tests and gauges made at the end of the year as compared with similar tests
and gauges made at the time the settled flow was determined.
For the purpose of computing the depletion the territory compre
507 hended in a given lease will be considered the unit with respect to
which the depletion deduction may be claimed and allowed.
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During the continuance of the ownership under which the value
was fixed or by which the investment was made, there can be no
revaluation for the purpose of this deduction if it should be found that
the quantity of oil or gas in the property was underestimated at the time
the value was fixed or the property was acquired, or at the time the lease
contract was entered into or purchased.
This rule will not, however, be so construed as to forbid an oper
509 ator from redistributing the invested capital over the estimated num
ber of units remaining in the territory under operation if a subsequent
increase of invested capital should render this necessary in order to deter
mine the amount of such capital applicable to each unit, provided that when
such redistribution is made the total capital invested will be reduced by the
amount previously charged off and deducted on account of depletion or as
a return of capital.

508

ADDITIONAL DEPRECIATION FOR MACHINERY, ETC.

Both owners and lessees operating oil or gas properties will, in
510 addition to and separate from the deduction allowable for the deple
tion or return of capital as hereinbefore provided for, be permitted
to deduct a reasonable allowance for depreciation of physical property, such
as machinery, tools, equipment, pipes, etc., the amount deductible upon this
account to be such an amount, based upon its capitalized value (cost) equit
ably distributed over its useful life, as will bring it to its true salvage value
when no longer useful for the purpose for which such property was ac
quired.
As to both fee owner and lessee, the capital invested in physical
511
property, upon which the depreciation deduction is computed, should
be segregated in the books of account from that invested in the oil
or gas territory or in the lease or leases, with respect to which the deduc
tion for depletion or return of capital is claimed, and credits for deprecia
tion may be made in the same manner as hereinbefore provided for de
pletion.
STATEMENT REQUIRED.

To each return made by an individual or corporation owning, or
512 holding under lease, oil or gas properties there should be attached a
statement showing—
(1) (a) The fair market value of the property or interest therein
513
(exclusive of machinery, equipment, etc.) as of March 1, 1913, if
acquired prior to that date, or (b) the actual cost thereof if acquired
on or after that date.
514
(2) How the fair market value as of March 1, 1913, was ascer
tained.
(3) The estimated quantity of oil or gas in the sand at the time
515
the value or cost was determined.
(4) Amount of capital applicable to each unit.
516
(5) The quantity of oil or gas produced during the year for which
517
the return is made.
(6) Any other data which would be helpful in determining the
518
reasonableness of the depletion deduction.

JOSEPH W. FIRTH
Joseph W. Firth, member of the American Institute of Accountants,
died September 9, 1922. Mr. Firth was a certified public accountant of
New York and had been in practice for many years. He was a partner
in the firm of Cornwall & Firth.
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